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SUMMARY - The study aims to explore the relationship between institutional ownership and firm performance. To obtain 
the targeted objectives, the required data, ranging from 2008 to 2013 were collected from annual reports and financial 
statements of concerned firms. Such type of data contains endogeneity problems. In order to deal with endogeneity 
problem, Durbin-Wu-Houseman test was applied. Among many advance econometric techniques, OLS and 2SLS were found 
appropriate to estimate the coefficient of interest. Institutional ownership being endogenous variable was found 
significantly and positively related with firm performance. Firm performance was found negatively related with debt 
ratio and fix expenditures. Finally it was found that institutional investors take more interest in firms having higher 
dividend payout ratio.  
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Institutional investors are important stake 
holder of today’s financial market and appeared as 
integral force in equity market. They are major 
player not only in the developed market but also in 
the emerging markets of the world. The amount of 
funds held by them can be guessed from the fact 
that more than 50% of shares of listed firms in 
London stock exchange are held by institution 
investors in U.K. Similarly in United States these 
institutions hold round about 5% in 1945, 8% in 
1950, 33% in 1980, 45% in 1990, 60% in 2003 and 67% 
of total shares of listed companies in 2010 and their 
shareholding increasing continuously (Blume and 
keim, 2012). In 2005 these professional investors 
manage financial assets exceeding US$45 trillion 
including over US$20 trillion in equities (IMF 
Report, 2005).Therefore now they have become 
more visible and active in influencing the major 
business decision and firms. 
In past these investors were not directly 
involved in decision making and follow the exit 
policy by selling the shares held by them if they 
were not satisfied with management policies and 
decisions.  But now due to increasing ownership of 
equity they have become more powerful to raise 
their voice in case of disagreement with 
management and hence are actively participating 
in the corporate decision making process through 
their voting right in company’s meetings and try to 
influence the firm top management to take care 
the long-term interest of shareholders. Thus these 
institutional investors are playing very effective 
monitoring role and hence improving firm 
performance. 
In the developing countries like Pakistan 
institutional investors are not actively participating 
in corporate decision making due to large 
shareholding by family business and groups. 
Institutional investors are not deep rooted in the 
corporate sector of Pakistan and the main reason 
of this is unavailability of suitable environment and 
lack of interest by the institutional owners in the 
corporate governance of the country. Company’s 
ordinance 1984 and the code of corporate 
governance 2002 contain many provisions regarding 
the active participation of shareholders in the 
managerial affairs of the investee companies 
(Shabbir, 2012). Therefore the role of institutional 
investors is enhancing in Pakistani equity market in 
recent years and they have started to monitor 
management affair, disclosure of voting policy, 
appointment of non-executive directors, external 
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1.1 Agency Theory: 
 
Agency relationship is very common relationship 
in large business organizations and firms in which 
shareholders act as principle and management as 
their agent. Agency problem started with the 
separation of management and ownership when 
size of business corporations become large and 
owners hired business managers as their agents to 
run their businesses. (Smith, 1776; Berle and 
Means, 1932; Ross, 1973; Jensen and Meckling. 
1976; Agrawal, 1996; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) 
studied the agency problem and tried to mitigate 
these problems ascend due to difference of interest 
between managers and shareholders. Smith (1776) 
found that managers cannot run the businesses like 
owners of the business organizations. Similarly 
Berle and Means (1932) questioned the ability of 
shareholders to monitor the managers being the 
owners and declared the effect of ownership on 
firm performance as subject to debate. Stephen A. 
Ross in 1973 declared the agency relationship as 
one of the oldest and argued that the conflict arises 
due to difference of interest between managers 
and shareholders. Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
studied the same contractual relationship between 
shareholders and managers concluding that the 
agency costs are real and develop a theory known 
as “Agency Theory” stating that company 
performance is affected by the conflict of interest 
between principle (shareholders) and agents 
(management).The agency problem cannot be 
eliminated but it can be reduced by giving 
incentives to managers, ownership right in the 
corporation and by enabling their monitoring by 
creditors and institutional investors (Jenson and 
Meckling, 1976). Further studies (Agrawal, 1996; 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1997 and Denis and McConnell, 
2003) argued in favor of agency theory by declaring 
that corporate governance and institutional 
ownership can reduce the agency problem and 
improve the firm performance. 
 
1.2 Problem Statement: 
 
Institutional investors play important role in 
improving firm performance by monitoring firm 
management and reducing agency problem. The 
corporations with low shareholdings of institutional 
owners have weak governance structure and show 
poor performance. Despite efforts made to improve 
ownership structure, the level of institutional 
ownership is still low in Pakistan. This is a serious 
obstacle in improving firm performance in 
developing countries especially in Pakistan. 
 
1.3 Objectives of the Study: 
 
1- Examine the effect of institutional ownership 
on the firm performance.   
2- Examine effect of firm performance on the 
shareholdings of institutional investors. 
 
1.4 Research Questions: 
 
1- How does institutional investors play role 
to increase the firm performance? 
2- How does firm performance attract the 
institutional investors? 
 
1.5 Significance of the Study: 
 
Many researchers have studied the institutional 
ownership and their relationship with firm 
performance and showed mixed results. This study 
tries to clarify the relationship of institutional 
investors and firm performance. Moreover, a very 
few researchers have conducted on the role of 
institutional investors in Pakistani firms, hence this 
study reduce the knowledge gap of institutional 
investors.  
 
1.6 Organization of the Study: 
  
Remaining of the study is organized as: section 
two reviews the literature of existing relationship 
between institutional ownership and firm 
performance. Section three shows the theoretical 
framework of the study. Section four explains the 
data and methodology and section five discuss the 
empirical results. Section six concludes the 
discussion and Section seven give directions for the 
future studies.  
 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Pounds (1988) studied the relationship between 
institutional ownership and firm performance by 
using the data of 100 U.S firms over the period of 
1981-1985. By applying cross-sectional comparison 
approach and log it regressions model he found 
association between institutional investors and 
firm value. He further claimed that the 
institutional investor effect is positive when they 
monitor firms efficiently and this relationship 
becomes negative when they work only for their 
own benefits and interest.  
Mcconnel and Servaes (1990) conducted a 
research to test the relationship between firm 
value and ownership structure on two samples of 
1173 firms in 1976 and 1093 firms in 1986 
respectively. By applying regression model on the 
data they found a positive and significant 
relationship between firm’s value and ownership of 
institutional investors. Furthermore they also 
concluded that institutional investors monitor the 
firm and force the management to maximize firm 
value. 
Chaganti and Damanpour (1991) tested whether 
institutional ownership and capital structure have 
any impact on firm value. For this purpose they 
used the data of 80 US firms over period of 1983-
1985. They used institutional ownership as 
TAhIR, h. S., SAlEEM, M., ARShAD, h.
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independent variable and firm performance as 
dependent variable and found ROE as measure of 
financial performance as positively related to 
institutional ownership. They also concluded that 
institutional shareholder serve as efficient monitor 
in lieu of creditors. 
Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) while investigating 
the link between control mechanism and firm value 
applied the cross-sectional OLS regression model. 
They used ownership of insiders, institutions, large 
block holders and outside directors as independent 
variable and firm value as dependent variable.  
They used the data of 383 large companies out of 
500 US firms and found insignificant relationship 
between fractions of shares owned by institutional 
investors and firm performance.  
Duggel and Miller (1999) conducted a study to 
check the effect of institutional investors on 
performance of different corporations. They 
employ OLS regression model and standard event 
study methodology on S&P 500 index over the 
period of 1985-1990 and find the positive but 
insignificant relationship between stock-holding 
scale of institutional investors and firm 
performance. 
Tsai and Gu (2007) conducted a study to check 
the link between institutional investors and casino 
firm value over the period of 1999-2003. They used 
proxy of Q as the measure of performance of 24 
casino firms. By applying simultaneous equation 
model they found positive and significant 
relationship between institutional investors and 
casino’s performance. Furthermore they concluded 
that institutional shareholders increase managerial 
monitoring and help in improving firm 
performance. 
 Ferreira and Matos (2008) studied the role of 
institutional shareholders around the globe using 
the broad data set of equity holding from 27 
countries. By employing three stage least square 
regressions model they found positive relationship 
between institutional ownership and firm 
performance and concluded that the firms with 
higher institutional investors have higher firm 
valuation and better operating performance.  
Elyasiani and Jia (2010) investigated the link 
between firm performance and level and stability 
of institutional investors of non-financial firms. By 
applying the simultaneous equation model on 1532 
firms over the period of 1992-2004, they found that 
both shareholding proportion and the shareholding 
stability are essential for the monitoring 
effectiveness of the institutional investor and long 
term institutional ownership is linked with better 
firm performance. 
Charfeddine and Elmarzougui (2010) by taking 
the institutional ownership as endogenous variable 
explored the impact of institutional shareholding 
on French listed firms. They used the sample of 35 
firms listed in Paris stock exchange and CAC 40 
index consisting of 140 observations period from 
2002 to 2005. By using simultaneous equation 
model, they found that institutional shareholding 
have significant negative effect on performance. 
Alfariah, Alanezi and Almujamed (2012) 
investigated the effect of institutional ownership 
on performance of firm listed in Kuwait Stock 
Exchange. They used institutional ownership as 
independent variable and firm performance as 
dependent variable and firm size, firm leverage, 
dividend payout and board size as control variable. 
By applying two multivariate regression models, 
they found significantly positive relationship 
between firm performance and institutional 
ownership. 
 
2.1 Gap of the Study: 
 
According to our limited knowledge in Pakistan 
very few researchers have examined the 
relationship between institutional ownership and 
firm performance and that work is done while 
considering the institutional ownership as 
exogenous variable. The contribution of the study 
is that this is examining the relationship between 
institutional ownership and firm performance by 
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4. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
The current study investigated the relationship 
between institutional ownership and performance 
of firms listed in KSE 30 Index. The required data 
was collected for consecutive six years ranging 
from 2008-2013 through their annual reports and 
financial statements. The sample of study 
consisted of 126 observations of 21 non-financial 
listed firms.  
 
4.1 Description of Variables 
 
This study used three types of variables which 
are explained below: 
 
4.1.1 Independent Variable: 
  
Institutional ownership is used as independent 
variable in equation (1) and (2). The ownership of 
institutional investors is measured by number of 
outstanding shares held by them in a firm at the 
end of financial year and this can be known from 
shareholding pattern in the annual reports of the 
firms. Where in equation (3) and (4) firm 
performance is used as independent variable and 
measured by ROA and ROE. 
 Return on Assets (ROA):  ROA is the ratio of 
net income of firm at the end of year to its total 
assets and is used as accounting measure of firm 
performance in this study. Many researchers have 
used this ratio to measure the firm performance 
(Chaganti and Damanpour, 1991) and it is measured 
from following formula: 
ROA = Net Annual Income / Total Assets 
Return on Equity (ROE): ROE is ratio of net 
income of the firm at end of financial year to its 
shareholder’s equity and it shows net income as 
percentage of shareholder’s equity (Bhattacharya 
and Graham, 2009). It is calculated from following 
formula: 
ROE = Net Annual Income / Shareholder’s Equity 
 
4.1.2 Dependent Variable: 
 
Firm performance is used as dependent variable 
while checking the impact of institutional 
ownership on firm performance in equation (1) and 
(2) and Institutional ownership is used as 
dependent variable while investigating the effect 
of firm performance on institutional ownership in 
equation (3) and (4). 
 
4.1.3 Control Variables: 
 
There are following variables which are used as 
control variables in the study: 
1. Size: Size mean size of the company and it is 
measured by logarithm of total assets at the end 
of financial year. Size of firm may affect firm 
performance and institutional investor’s 
ownership. 
2. DEBT: Debt means debt ratio and it represent 
the firm leverage and measure from the ratio of 
total debt to total assets and calculated through 
following formula: 
  Debt ratio = Total debt/Total assets 
3. Fixed: Fixed means expenditure on fixed assets 
i.e. on plant and equipment and is measured as 
the fraction of sales revenue. 
4. DIV: DIV indicating the dividend payout ratio is 
included in the model as controlling variable to 
show that dividend payout affect the 
institutional investors to invest and hold the 
stock in the firm. 
 Dividend Payout Ratio = Dividend / Net Profit 
after Tax 
 
4.2 Research Hypotheses Development: 
 
Existing literature on the relationship between 
institutional ownership and firm performance 
suggests that the firm performance is linked with 
institutional investors. If they are actively taking 
part in monitoring then it affect firm performance 
positively and significantly. On the basis of existing 
literature we can develop the following 
hypotheses: 
H1: Institutional ownership has significant and 
positive effect on firm performance.  
H0: Institutional ownership has no effect on 
firm performance. 
Similarly firm performance also effect the level 
of shareholdings of institutional investors in the 
firms. (Ferreira and Matos, 2008; Elyasiani and Jia, 
2010) found that firm performance effect the level 
of shareholdings and stability of institutional 
shareholders. On the basis of these studies we can 
develop the following hypothesis:  
H2: There is positive and significant impact of 
firm performance on the institutional ownership. 
H0: There is no impact of firm performance on 
the institutional ownership. 
 
4.3 Model Specification: 
 
In order to test the hypothesis we use OLS 
regression and 2SLS regression model on the sample 
data of firms and following models are developed: 
ROAit = α + β0INSTit+ β1SIZEit+ β2DEBTit + β3FIXit 
+Eit  ... (1) 
ROEit = α + β0INSTit+ β1SIZEit+ β2DEBTit + β3FIXit 
+Eit ... (2) 
INSTit= α + β0ROAit+ β1SIZEit+ β2DEBTit + β3DIVit 
+Eit ... (3) 
INSTit= α + β0ROEit+ β1SIZEit+ β2DEBTit + β3DIVit 
+Eit ... (4) 
 
4.4 Endogeneity and the Durbin-Wu-Hausman 
Test: 
  
Demsetz (1983) argued that ownership structure 
is endogenous variable and can lead to inclusive 
and biased results when studying the ownership 
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structure and firm performance relationship. Later 
on many studies (Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001; 
Clay, 2001) provide the empirical evidence on the 
endogenous behavior of ownership structure of 
firms. On this base this study considers the 
institutional ownership as endogenous variable. 
Following (Tsai and Gu, 2007; Charfeddine and 
Elmarzougui, 2010) we apply Durbin-Wu-Hausman 
test to check endogeneity of institutional 
ownership and firm performance measures (ROA, 
and ROE). To check endogeneity INST as suspicious 
endogenous variable will be regressed against all 
exogenous variables in equations i.e. SIZE, DEBT, 
FIX and DIV and residual (INST_res) will be saved as 
follow: 
INST= α0 + β1SIZE + β2DEBT + β3FIX + β4DIV + 
β5INST_res… (5) 
 INST_res obtained will be added to equation (1) 
and regression model is run again as follow: 
ROA = α0 + β1INST + β2SIZE + β3DEBT + β4FIX + 
β5INST_res + E… (6) 
After regressing this equation if coefficient of 
INST_res is significantly different from zero in the 
t-statistics, the OLS results will considered as 
biased and inconsistent and use of 2SLS regression 
model is justified for equation (1). If INST_res is not 
significantly different from zero in t-statistics then 
OLS results will be considered as unbiased and 
consistent and 2SLS regression is not applied. 
Similarly performance measures (ROA and ROE) 
may be endogenous variable and Durbin-Wu-
Hausman test (DWH test) will be applied to accept 
or reject the use of 2SLS. 
 
5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION: 
 
Regression model is applied in the study to know 
the relationship between institutional ownership 
and firm performance and following empirical 
results are obtained. 
 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics: 
 
Descriptive statistics for the required variables 
of the sample firms is presented as follow: 
 
TABLE 1 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF SAMPLE FIRMS 



















































Table 1 represent the descriptive statistics of 
sample firms with 126 observations of six year 
pooled data from 2008-2013 used in the regression 
analysis. On average institutional shareholding is 
26.43% (Median= 24.86%) ranges from 0.52% to 
87.28% showing that institutional investors do not 
hold significant ownership in the sample firms. The 
firm performance measured by ROA and ROE with 
mean value 8.75% and 11.84% respectively. The 
mean size of sample firms is 7.807 (Median= 7.725) 
with a minimum of 7.030 and maximum of 8.620 
where fixed expenditures as fraction of sales (FIX) 
is 1.145 on average. As for dividend and financing 
concern, average dividend payout (DIV) is 0.384 
and debt ratio (DEBT) with mean of 54.96% shows 
that sample firms rely relatively more on the debt 
financing than on equity. The standard deviations 
values of the variables are very high which show 
that sample contain firms with different 
characteristics. 
  
5.2 The Durbin-Wu-Hausman Test: 
  
By applying DWH test on the INST and 
performance measures (ROA and ROE) in all 
equations following results are generated: 
 
TABLE 2 DWH TEST RESULTS FOR INST 
Dependent Variable: Firm Performance (ROA) 






























As shown in Table 2, the DWH test shows that 
coefficient of INST_res is significantly different 
from zero (t= -3.232, p= 0.002) at 0.01 significance 
level. The endogeneity of INST_res against ROA is 
evident and applying OLS will produce biased and 
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inconsistent regression coefficient and application 
of 2SLS in equation (1) is justified.  
 
 
TABLE 3 DWH TEST RESULTS FOR INST 
Dependent Variable: Firm Performance (ROE) 































As shown in Table 3, the DWH test shows that 
coefficient of INST_res is significantly different 
from zero (t= -2.407, p= 0.018) at 0.05 significance 
level. The endogeneity of INST_res against ROE is 
evident and applying OLS will produce biased and 
inconsistent regression coefficient and use of 2SLS 
in equation (2) is justified.  
 
 
TABLE 4 DWH TEST RESULTS FOR ROA 
Dependent Variable: Institutional Ownership (INST) 































As shown in Table 4, the DWH test shows that 
coefficient of INST_res is not significantly different 
from zero (t= -0.599, p= 0.550) and ROA_res is not 
endogenous against INST.  Therefore applying OLS 
is sufficient and will produce unbiased and 
consistent regression coefficient and 2SLS in 
equation (3) is not justified. 
 
TABLE 5 DWH TEST RESULTS FOR ROE 
Dependent Variable: Institutional Ownership (INST) 































As Table 5 shows the DWH test results of 
coefficient of INST_res is not significantly different 
from zero (t= 0.678, p= 0.499) and it indicate that 
applying OLS in equation (4) is appropriate and will 
give unbiased and consistent regression coefficient 
and 2SLS is not justified in this equation. 
 
5.3 Regression Results and Discussion: 
 
Regression model is statistical tool used to know 
relationship between variables. We employ OLS 
and 2SLS regression model to know the relationship 
between institutional ownership and firm 
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TABLE 6 REGRESSION RESULTS OF PERFORMANCE EQUATION (1) 

















































Tables 6 shows in OLS model institutional 
investors has significant and positive effect on firm 
performance determined by ROA (t= 3.056, p= 
0.003) at 0.01 significance level. Considering 
institutional ownership as endogenous variable as 
DWH test proved that INST in 2SLS is also found 
having significantly and positively related to firm 
performance (ROA). These findings are consistent 
to the previous researches (Alfaraih, Alanezi and 
Almujamed, 2012).  
Size has positive but insignificant effect on ROA 
in both OLS and 2SLS regression model as showing 
(t= 0.967, p= 0.335) and (t= 0.606, p= 0.546) 
respectively indicating that large firms owns more 
resources and perform well but size is not 
significantly affect performance. DEBT was found 
negatively and significantly affecting the firm 
performance (t= -4.449, p= 0.000) at 0.01 
significance level and consistent with previous 
researches (Alfaraih, Alanezi and Almujamed, 
2012; Elyasiani and Jia, 2010). Similarly FIX exhibit 
insignificant and negative effect on ROA in 2SLS (t= 
-1.419, p= 0.158) in the sample firms. The adjusted 
R2 for equation (1) is 0.443for OLS and 0.278 for 
2SLS indicating that INST effect performance 
measured by ROA 44.3% in OLS and 27.8% in 2SLS 
model where the F-statistics is 25.87 in OLS and 
13.006 in 2SLS at 0.01 significance  directing that 
both models are statistically significant. 
 
 
TABLE 7 REGRESSION RESULTS OF PERFORMANCE EQUATION (2) 
















































Tables 7 shows in OLS model institutional 
investors has significant and positive effect on firm 
performance (t= 3.324, p= 0.001) at 0.01 
significance level. Due to endogenous behavior of 
institutional ownership 2SLS is applied and INST 
found significantly and positively linked to ROA (t= 
2.469, p= 0.015) at 0.05 significance level. These 
findings are consistent to the previous researches 
(Mahoney and Roberts, 2007).  
Size has negative and insignificant effect on ROA 
in both OLS and 2SLS regression model as showing 
(t=-0.750, p= 0.455) and (t= 0.642, p= 0.522) 
respectively. DEBT was found negatively and 
significantly affecting the firm performance (t= -
3.594, p= 0.000) at 0.01 significance level in OLS 
but becomes insignificant in 2SLS as (t= -1.676, p= 
0.096). Similarly FIX exhibit significant and 
negative effect on ROA in OLS (t= -1.771, p= 0.079) 
and become insignificant in 2SLS (t=-0.154, 
p=0.878). The adjusted R2 for equation (2) is 0.167 
for OLS and 0.96 for 2SLS indicating that INST effect 
performance measured ROA 96% in 2SLS model 
where the F-statistics is 7.284 in OLS and 4.306 in 
2SLS. 
Table 8 shows the results of OLS regression 
model for equation (3). Firm performance is found 
significant determinant of institutional ownership 
as (t= 2.647, p= 0.009) and is consistent with 
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TABLE 8 REGRESSION RESULTS OF INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP EQUATION (3) 
Dependent Variable: Institutional Ownership (INST) 



























Size effect negatively and insignificantly 
institutional ownership in OLS as (t=-0.200, p= 
0.841) and this result is inconsistent with previous 
researches (Elyasiani and Jia, 2010; Tsai and Gu, 
2007). The debt is positively related to institutional 
ownership which is inconsistent with previous 
researches (Mahoney and Roberts, 2007). However 
DIV has significant and positive relation with 
institutional ownership as (t= 2.136, p= 0.035) at 
0.05 significance level. In OLS regression model F-
statistics is 4.853 and the adjusted R2 for equation 
(3) is 0.110 showing that main explanatory 
variables are not included in this model.
 
 
TABLE 9 REGRESSION RESULTS OF INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP EQUATION (4) 
Dependent Variable: Institutional Ownership (INST) 



























Table 9 shows firm performance (ROE) has 
positive and significant effect on institutional 
ownership in equation (4) as (t= 2.860, p= 0.005) at 
0.01 significant level and is consistent with 
(Mahoney and Robert, 2007) indicating that 
institutional shareholding increase significantly 
with improvement in performance. 
Size effect positively on institutional ownership 
as (t=-0.329, p= 0.743) and directs that 
institutional investors desire to invests in large 
firms. DEBT is insignificantly but positively related 
to institutional ownership which is inconsistent 
with prior studies (Tsai and Gu, 2007; Charfeddine 
and Elmarzougui, 2010). However DIV has 
significant and positive relation with institutional 
ownership as (t= 2.351, p= 0.020) at 0.05 
significance level indicating that institutional 
investors invest in firms with higher dividends. F-
statistics is 5.175 and the adjusted R2 for equation 
(4) is 0.118.  
  
6. CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS: 
 
Agency theory suggests that institutional 
investors monitor the firm management from 
governance viewpoint and help in increasing the 
firm performance. Many studies empirically 
examined the relationship between institutional 
ownership and firm performance but produced 
mixed results. This study is conducted to clarify the 
relationship between institutional investors and 
firm performance by using the annual data of 21 
listed firms in KSE 30 index from 2008 to 2013.  
The empirical results of the study found 
evidences on the endogeneity of institutional 
ownership and these results are consistent with 
previous studies (Demsetz, 1983; Clay, 2001; Tsai 
and Gu, 2007; Charfeddine and Elmarzougui; 2010). 
Considering institutional ownership as endogenous 
we applied OLS and 2SLS model to estimate the 
coefficient of interest. The Durbin-Wu-Hausman 
test on the endogeneity of institutional ownership 
also justifies the adoption of 2SLS model in the 
study.  Institutional ownership has positive and 
significant effect on firm performance measured by 
ROA and ROE in both OLS and 2SLS regressions and 
these findings were consistent with previous 
researches (Chaganti and Damnpour, 1991; 
McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Tsai and Gu, 2007; 
Ferreira and Matos; 2008). 
The study found DEBT significantly and 
negatively related with firm performance which 
indicates that firm with higher leverage perform 
poorly which is consistent with previous studies 
(Elyasiani and Jia, 2010) however in institutional 
ownership equation positive relation was found 
between DEBT and institutional ownership which is 
inconsistent with previous studies (Tsai and Gu, 
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2007; Charfeddine and Elmarzougui, 2010).FIX have 
significant and negative impact on the firm 
performance measured by ROA and ROE indicating 
that higher fixed expenditures decrease firm 
performance. The results of this study also show 
that DIV signifies positive and significant effect on 
institutional ownership which suggests that 
institutional investors take more interest in firms 
with higher dividend payout ratio. 
 
6.1 Policy Implications: 
 
1- Assist the business managers to understand the 
role of institutional ownership in improving the 
firm performance. 
2- Help the institutional investors to increase their 
shareholdings in the listed firms of Pakistan to 
improve firm performance. 
3- Help the policy makers to designs such policies 
which not only increase the institutional ownership 




7. DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE STUDIES: 
 
1- Further researches may include other measures 
of performance such as Tobin’s Q, profit margin, 
operating cash flow, price earnings ratio etc.  
2- Sample size and time period may be increased 
to increase the predictability of research.  
3- Other ownership types such as director’s 
ownership and family ownership can be modeled in 
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